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I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts have struggled for nearly fifty years to maintain a 
retroactivity doctrine, which allows meaningful relief for those who 
deserve it without flooding the court system with petitions from 
cases long since closed.1 In Roman Nose v. State, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that it will not retroactively 
apply the rule prohibiting mandatory life without possibility of 
release for juveniles (LWOR).2 The majority held that the rule does 
not fall into either of the two exceptions allowing retroactive 
application of rules of criminal procedure.3 
This case note first reviews the history of the retroactivity 
doctrine and the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
prohibiting mandatory LWOR for juveniles.4 It then discusses the 
facts and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis of the Roman 
Nose decision.5 Next, it argues that the majority was wrong to 
reaffirm the analysis used in deciding whether a rule applies 
retroactively because the analysis creates disparate results.6 Finally, 
it concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court should have 
adopted a clear retroactivity doctrine and applied it to the 
prohibition against mandatory LWOR retroactively.7 
 
 1.  See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271–75 (2008). 
 2.  Roman Nose v. State (Roman Nose II), 845 N.W.2d 193, 198–201 (Minn. 
2014). 
 3.  Id. at 199–200. 
 4.  See infra Part II. 
 5.  See infra Part III.A–B. 
 6.  See infra Part IV. 
 7.  See infra Part IV–V .  
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II. HISTORY OF THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE 
A. Origins of the Retroactivity Doctrine 
Limiting the retroactive application of new court rules is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.8 In his commentaries, William 
Blackstone explained that it is not the responsibility of the court 
“‘to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old 
one.’”9 In this vein of reasoning, a judge does not create law, but 
rather he or she is its “discoverer.”10 As far back as 1801 the 
Supreme Court has adhered to this doctrine, evidenced by an 
opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall concerning the 
retroactivity of a treaty between the United States and France.11 In 
that opinion Marshall ruled, “unconstitutional action ‘confers no 
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no 
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it has 
never been passed.’”12 Over 164 years of jurisprudence reaffirmed 
this broad view of retroactivity.13 
In the 1965 case of Linkletter v. Walker, the Supreme Court of 
the United States, for the first time, imposed a limit on the 
retroactivity of new rules.14 The Court progressively applied the Bill 
of Rights to the states,15 and as more of these rights applied to the 
 
 8.  See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.6 (1965) (“‘I know of no 
authority in this court to say that in general state decisions shall make law only for 
the future. Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand 
years.’” (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting))). 
 9.  Id. at 622–23 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69).  
 10.  Id. at 623 (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 
222 (1st ed. 1909)).  
 11.  United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801) (involving 
captured naval ships). But see Brief for Respondents at 4, Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618 
(No. 95) (arguing that Schooner Peggy embodies the view that a new rule applies to 
cases pending on direct review, but not necessarily on collateral review, because 
the treaty did not apply to ships on which seizure was final). 
 12.  Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623 (quoting Norton v. Shelby Cnty., 118 U.S. 425, 
442 (1886)).  
 13.  See, e.g., Kuhn, 215 U.S. at 369–70; Norton, 118 U.S. at 442. 
 14.  Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 273 (2008); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 
629; see also Ann N. Bosse, Retroactivity and the Supreme Court, 41 MD. B.J. 30, 30 
(2008) (providing a brief overview of Supreme Court cases addressing the 
retroactivity doctrine). 
 15.  See Danforth, 552 U.S. at 272. See generally, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 
3
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states, federal courts became increasingly overwhelmed with 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus.16 Linkletter determined that not 
all rules apply retroactively17 and denied the retroactive use of the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.18 
According to Linkletter, cases pending on direct review receive 
the benefit of a change in law, but no such bright line exists for 
prior judgments based on subsequently invalidated rules.19 After 
deciding it was neither required to nor prohibited from making 
rules retroactive, the Court devised certain considerations to 
determine whether a rule applies retroactively, including the 
purpose of the rule.20 However, the years subsequent to Linkletter’s 
new restriction resulted in unpredictable decisions.21 To curb the 
erratic results, the Court felt the need to further expand the 
retroactivity analysis to include not just “convictions now final . . . 
 
368, 408 (1964) (applying a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to not be 
compelled as a witness against him or herself to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the 
states). 
 16.  Danforth, 552 U.S. at 272 (“The serial incorporation of the Amendments 
in the Bill of Rights during the 1950’s and 1960’s imposed more constitutional 
obligations on the States and created more opportunity for claims that individuals 
were being convicted without due process and held in violation of the 
Constitution.”). 
 17.  Id. at 273 (“[T]he retroactive effect of each new rule should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis . . . .” (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629)); see also 
Bosse, supra note 14, at 30–31.  
 18.  See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639–40. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1963) (applying the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to the states); Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (determining that the exclusionary rule 
emanates from the Fourth Amendment).  
 19.  Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627, 629 (“[W]e believe that the Constitution 
neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. . . . We think the Federal 
Constitution has no voice upon the subject.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 20.  See id. at 636 (relying on three considerations: (1) the purpose of the new 
rule, (2) the reliance placed on the invalidated rule, and (3) the effect on the 
administration of justice if the new rule applied retroactively).  
 21.  Danforth, 552 U.S. at 273–74. For example, the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against self-incrimination was applied to a defendant on direct review 
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–73 (1966), but was held not to apply to 
another defendant on direct review using the Linkletter standard. Johnson v. New 
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733–35 (1966).  
4
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[but] convictions at various stages of trial and direct review” as 
well.22 This was adopted as the “Linkletter-Stovall” approach.23 
B. The Teague Analysis 
In 1989 the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane 
took it upon itself to again redefine retroactivity and narrow its 
scope.24 The Court was no longer concerned with the 
considerations used in Linkletter.25 Instead, the analysis shifted to 
whether the rule announced was substantive or procedural.26 The 
Court held that new rules generally do not apply retroactively after 
direct review concludes.27 However, two exceptions to this rule 
exist.28 First, a new rule applies retroactively if it is substantive law.29 
Second, a new rule applies retroactively, despite being procedural, 
if it is a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure” implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings.30 
Rules of substance apply retroactively because “they 
‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands 
 
 22.  Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967).  
 23.  See generally Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 2009) 
(“Under the so-called Linkletter-Stovall test, we decided whether to give retroactive 
effect to a particular decision based on (1) the purpose of the decision, (2) 
reliance on the prior rule of law, and (3) the effect upon the administration of 
justice of granting retroactive effect.”). 
 24.  489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)  
 25.  See id. at 301 (“[The] retroactivity determination would normally entail 
application of the Linkletter standard, but we believe that our approach to 
retroactivity for cases on collateral review requires modification.”).  
 26.  Id. at 307 (adopting previous dissents and concurrences of Justice 
Harlan). 
 27.  New rules of criminal procedural generally apply to cases on “direct 
review or not yet final.” See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300–10; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 
U.S. 314, 328 (1987).  
 28.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 300–10. It should be noted the preliminary burden in 
the analysis is to determine whether the rule being discussed is a new rule. See id. 
at 301. 
 29.  Id. at 307 (“‘[A] new rule should be applied retroactively if it places 
certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the 
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 
401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971))). It wasn’t until 2004 that the Court explicitly explained 
that this exception applied to “substantive rules”; the explanation seems only to be 
a semantic shift. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004).  
 30.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–13; see also Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 
323 (Minn. 2013). 
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convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a 
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”31 On the other 
hand, procedural rules do not apply retroactively because “[t]hey 
do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law 
does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that 
someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might 
have been acquitted otherwise.”32 To Justice Scalia, this is a “more 
speculative connection to innocence” warranting retroactivity in “a 
small set of ‘watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings.’”33 
C. Minnesota’s Application of Teague 
Minnesota applied the Linkletter-Stovall test to determine 
retroactivity until 2004,34 when it finally adopted the Teague 
analysis.35 In adopting Teague fifteen years after the Supreme Court 
decided it, the Minnesota Supreme Court believed that it was 
bound to its application.36 The Minnesota Supreme Court trusted 
that while it was able to determine the retroactivity of state law,37 it 
was mandated to “follow the lead of the Supreme Court” when 
called upon to decide the retroactivity of a federal rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure.38 
However, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed 
Minnesota’s decision and declared that Teague is not binding on 
 
 31.  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 
620 (1998)).  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 484 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). 
 34.  See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1988) (basing 
retroactivity on (1) the purpose of the decision, (2) reliance on the prior rule of 
law, and (3) the effect upon the administration of justice of granting retroactive 
effect).  
 35.  O’Meara v. State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Minn. 2004) (holding that in the 
context of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, the court is “compelled 
to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in determining when a decision is to be 
afforded retroactive treatment”). 
 36.  The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that it was “not free to fashion 
[its] own standard of retroactivity.” Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Minn. 
2006). 
 37.  See O’Meara, 679 N.W.2d at 338 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 
U.S. 167, 177 (1990)).  
 38.  Id. at 339. 
6
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the states.39 Nevertheless, Minnesota continues to apply it 
voluntarily.40 Minnesota has reaffirmed its voluntary choice to apply 
Teague three times, and each time it has declined to decide in favor 
of retroactivity.41 
D. Mandatory Life Without Release for Juveniles 
1. The Founding Principle of the Juvenile Court: Rehabilitation 
The central focus of this article is the retroactivity doctrine and 
whether it should be applied to juveniles who were sentenced to 
mandatory LWOR.42 In order to adequately discuss this issue, 
however, this case note must briefly touch on the founding 
principle of rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.43 The 
juvenile system is first focused on rehabilitating juveniles, whereas 
the adult system is focused primarily on punishment and 
deterrence.44 The call for a distinct system to address the unique 
needs of juveniles who commit crimes originally fueled the creation 
of the first juvenile court.45 
 
 39.  Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 275 (2008) (pointing out that 
Teague and its progeny spoke in terms of federal habeas corpus remedies, so the 
states are not bound by Teague). 
 40.  See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009) (“We elect to 
retain Teague.”). 
 41.  See Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 200 (Minn. 2014); Chambers v. State, 
831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013); Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 499 (Minn. 
2012) (reviewing the retroactivity of a new rule holding that the Sixth Amendment 
is violated where a defendant is not informed about the deportation consequences 
of a guilty plea).  
 42.  See infra Part IV.  
 43.  This is despite the availability of previous, well-formed articles published 
by the William Mitchell Law Review involving juveniles and the criminal justice 
system. See, e.g., Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile 
Court in Minnesota—A Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
883, 889–93 (2006) (describing the origin and founding principles of the juvenile 
court in the United States and Minnesota); see also Nic Puechner, Note, No Clean 
Slates: Unpacking the Complications of Juvenile Expungements in the Wake of In re 
Welfare of J.J.P., 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1158, 1162–66 (2014) (advocating for 
reform to Minnesota’s juvenile expungement statute). 
 44.  See Walling & Driver, supra note 43, at 890–92.  
 45.  See id. at 889. The first juvenile court was created in 1899 in Chicago. Id. 
at 889. Prior to then, children fourteen and older were treated as adults. Sean 
Craig, Note, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road 
7
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Courts maintain a parens patriae46 role in guiding a juvenile 
back to law-abiding behavior.47 Historically, the juvenile court was 
meant to remove the harsh consequences attributed to the adult 
criminal system.48 The belief was that capital punishment and 
lengthy prison sentences have no deterrent effect on children, so 
they are repugnant.49 Since the juvenile system was not focused on 
punishing children, but rather on rehabilitation, it was believed 
that juveniles did not need the same constitutional protections as 
adult defendants.50 Although created with the best intentions, this 
paternalistic approach to delinquent children led to a deprivation 
of fundamental rights.51 
The application of parens patriae slowly gave way to stricter 
consequences mirroring adult sentences.52 These stricter 
consequences led the United States Supreme Court, in the 1960s, 
to hold for the first time that juvenile delinquency does, in fact, 
involve a substantial loss of freedoms that must be constitutionally 
 
Towards a Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 382 (2013). Before turning 
fourteen, juveniles maintained a rebuttable presumption that they were not 
criminally liable for their actions. Id. at 382. 
 46.  Parens Patriae is a doctrine in which the state provides protection for 
those unable to care for themselves and literally means “parent of his or her 
country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (10th ed. 2014). 
 47.  See Walling & Driver, supra note 43, at 914. 
 48.  See id. at 890. Juvenile matters are civil, not criminal. Id. at 894. Further, 
the terminology is different in juvenile court, creating a façade that juvenile 
proceedings are different from criminal proceedings. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 6.08 
(juveniles are respondents); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.04 (juveniles receive a 
disposition hearing); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05 (juveniles are adjudicated 
delinquent); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 2.1 (not defendants); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.01 (not 
convicted of crimes); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03 (not a sentencing hearing). 
 49.  Walling & Driver, supra note 43, at 891 (citing MONRAD G. PAULSEN & 
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 1 (N. Corinne Smith ed., 
1974)).  
 50.  Id. at 902.  
 51.  Id. at 903–04.  
 52.  Id. at 893–94 (“Many people characterized [the court’s treatment of 
juveniles] as punitive and indistinguishable from criminal dispositions.”); see, e.g., 
In re Welfare of D.D.N., 582 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. 1998) (“The juvenile court’s 
dispositions must be rehabilitative and tied to the needs of and opportunities for 
the child, . . . but these laws do not prohibit ‘a rational, punitive disposition, one 
where the record shows that correction or rehabilitation of the child reasonably 
cannot be achieved without a penalty.’” (quoting In re Welfare of C.A.W., 579 
N.W.2d 494, 497 n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998))).  
8
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protected.53 Specifically, one year later the Supreme Court held in 
In re Gault that the right to the notice of charges, the right to 
counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to 
confrontation, and the right to appellate review all apply to juvenile 
delinquency proceedings.54 The Court was hesitant to do away with 
any distinction between the adult and juvenile system—maintaining 
the semblance of parens patriae, so not all of the rights afforded to 
adult defendants are yet available to juveniles.55 However, the line 
between the adult and juvenile system is blurred, and in Minnesota, 
the harshest adult consequences are available to use against 
juveniles.56 
2. The Heinous Crimes Statute and Juveniles Tried as Adults 
Juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment in Minnesota were 
not always sentenced to die in prison.57 But two separate systems 
collided, resulting in harsher mandatory sentences for juveniles in 
adult court without the consideration of the juvenile’s age: (1) the 
creation and expansion of the heinous crimes statute, and (2) the 
expansion of the court’s ability to try juveniles as adults.58 
In the 1980s and early 1990s Minnesota, and much of the 
country, was transformed by a tough-on-crime approach to criminal 
justice.59 Minnesota created mandatory life imprisonment sentences 
 
 53.  See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to delinquency proceedings 
in a case involving a juvenile being removed to adult court by waiver).  
 54.  387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 47, 57–58 (1967).  
 55.  See id. at 30.  
We do not mean [by this] to indicate that the hearing to be held 
must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of 
the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must 
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.  
Id. (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56.  See infra note 67.  
 57.  Prior to the adoption of stricter sentences, an adult life sentence had the 
possibility of parole after a minimum of thirty years. See State v. Mitchell, 577 
N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1998).  
 58.  Id. at 488–90 (giving a brief overview of the heinous crime statute’s 
adoption in Minnesota and the broadening of the extended juvenile jurisdiction 
(EJJ) and certification processes).  
 59.  See id.; Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and 
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & 
9
Mazurek: Criminal Law: No Looking Back: Narrowing the Scope of the Retroac
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
2015] ROMAN NOSE V. STATE 339 
 
for “heinous” crimes.60 The heinous crimes statute signed into law 
in 1998 does not make a distinction between adult and juvenile 
offenders.61 Further, since the statute’s inception, the legislature 
has twice sharpened its teeth. First, the legislature expanded the list 
of heinous crimes requiring a mandatory life sentence.62 Second, it 
took away the possibility of parole for certain life sentences.63 
The juvenile system was not shielded from the national shift to 
more severe punitive policies.64 The drive to make juvenile court 
increasingly punitive was fueled by an increase in youth violence 
and a rhetorical fear of a “young generation of super-predators.”65 
As a result, an estimated 200,000 juveniles are tried as adults each 
year in the United States.66 Following this nationwide trend, 
Minnesota advanced its own policies to allow courts to prosecute 
more juveniles as adults.67 
 
INEQ. 263, 266–67 (2013). 
 60.  Act effective Aug. 1, 1998, ch. 367, art. 6, § 3, 1998 Minn. Laws 667, 727 
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.106 (2012)) (defining heinous crimes as first 
through third degree murder, first degree assault, and first through third degree 
criminal sexual conduct committed with “force or violence”). 
 61.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.106. But see State v. Ali, Nos. A12-0173, A13-0996, 
2014 WL 5012773, at *13 (Minn. Oct. 8, 2014) (holding that the heinous crimes 
statute can no longer be mandatorily applied to juveniles after the decision in 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). 
 62.  See Act of May 22, 2002, ch. 401, art. 1, § 13, 2002 Minn. Laws 1673, 1681 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.106) (including felony murder in 
furtherance of an act of terrorism to include a mandatory life sentence); Act of 
June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 2, § 5, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1127 (codified as amended 
at MINN. STAT. § 609.106) (including premeditated murder to require a mandatory 
life sentence). 
 63.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 4 (mandating that parole is not 
available for heinous crimes), with Act of Apr. 4, 1978, ch. 723, art. 1, § 5, 1978 
Minn. Laws 761, 764 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subdiv. 4 (1978)) (creating 
the possibility of parole after seventeen years for a mandatory life sentence).  
 64.  Feld, supra note 59, at 265–67 (advocating for a “youth discount” to 
formally mitigate all sentences imposed on juveniles).  
 65.  Id. at 266–67 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66.  Id. at 265. 
 67.  See State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 488–90 (Minn. 1998). First, in 1994 
the Minnesota legislature implemented extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ). Id. at 
489; see MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1994), repealed by Act of May 11, 1999, ch. 139, art. 
4, § 3, 1999 Minn. Laws 567, 692 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 260B.130 
(1999)). EJJ is a designation allowing juvenile courts to retain jurisdiction over a 
juvenile until he or she reaches twenty-one years old by imposing both an adult 
and juvenile sentence, while staying the adult portion of the sentence. MINN. STAT. 
10
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3. Prohibiting Mandatory LWOR for Juveniles 
As it did in In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court took 
steps to combat the harsher punishments used on juveniles.68 It did 
this through the lens of the Eighth Amendment’s protection 
against “cruel and unusual punishment.”69 
First, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court reopened a discussion 
foreclosed sixteen years earlier,70 holding that the Eighth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment forbid the 
imposition of the death penalty on any juvenile.71 In 2005, Justice 
Kennedy recognized in his majority opinion that the Court’s 
current understanding of what is “cruel and unusual” is based on 
“‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.’”72 Second, in 2010 the Court expanded its Eighth 
Amendment protection for juveniles in Graham v. Florida.73 In 
Graham the Court prohibited states from imposing LWOR on 
juveniles for non-homicide crimes.74 A common theme between 
 
§ 260B.130, subdiv. 4 (2012). The legislature implemented EJJ “in part because of 
the perception that juvenile court dispositions were often too lenient while the adult 
court sentences were often too harsh when applied to children.” Mitchell, 577 
N.W.2d at 489 (emphasis added). Second, the legislature also expanded juvenile 
certification in 1994, allowing fifteen-year-olds—now fourteen-year-olds—to be 
certified to adult court after showing that retaining the child in juvenile court 
would not serve public safety. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subdiv. 2(6)(ii) 
(1994)). Minnesota’s adult certification statute is now codified at MINN. STAT. 
§ 260B.125 (2012). 
 68.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).  
 69.  See id.  
 70.  See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–71 (1989) (rejecting the 
claim that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to use capital punishment 
on children over fifteen, but under eighteen, because there was not a national 
consensus to label it cruel and unusual), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. 551.  
 71.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573–74 (“When a juvenile offender commits a 
heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, 
but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature 
understanding of his own humanity.”). The Court had also held prior to Roper that 
it was cruel and unusual to apply the death sentence to criminals with intellectual 
disabilities and juveniles fifteen and younger. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 
(2002) (intellectual disabilities); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 
(1988) (juveniles under sixteen). 
 72.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 
(1958)).  
 73.  560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
 74.  Id. at 82. The court further explained that a state is not required to give 
11
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these cases is that the harshest juvenile consequences do not have 
the same deterrent effect as when applied to adult defendants.75 
Expounding on the new line of precedent creating special 
considerations for juveniles, the Court again reexamined a juvenile 
sentencing scheme in 2012.76 In an opinion authored by Justice 
Kagan, the Supreme Court, in its combined decision of Miller v. 
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs,77 held that sentencing a juvenile to 
mandatory LWOR violates the Eighth Amendment.78 Although the 
Court did not categorically prohibit LWOR for juveniles, it did 
comment, “[T]his harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”79 
The Court focused on the fact that Roper and Graham made it clear 
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for 
sentencing” based on “their lack of maturity and . . . undeveloped 
sense of responsibility,” which leads to “recklessness, impulsivity, 
and heedless risk-taking.”80 Justice Kagan explained that before a 
juvenile can be sentenced to LWOR, the court must consider the 
juvenile’s individual characteristics, including maturity and family 
environment.81 
 
freedom to a juvenile offender, but rather to “give defendants . . . some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.” Id. at 75.  
 75.  See id. (“Deterrence does not suffice to justify the sentence . . . .”); Roper, 
543 U.S. at 572 (“[N]either retribution nor deterrence provides adequate 
justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders . . . .”). 
 76.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  
 77.  Id. at 2461–62 (decided on collateral review); see also Jackson v. State, 194 
S.W.3d 757 (Ark. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011), rev’d, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455.  
 78.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (holding that the sentencing court must 
consider the individual characteristics of the juvenile before imposing LWOR). 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id. at 2464 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 81.  Id. at 2468. However, the Court failed to explain all of the factors to be 
considered and how each affects the sentence. See id.; see also State v. Ali, Nos. A12-
0173, A13-0996, 2014 WL 5012773, at *17 (Minn. Oct. 8, 2014) (remanding the 
case back to the district court to follow the basic factors outlined in Miller to 
determine whether the defendant may be sentenced to LWOR for an offense 
committed as a juvenile).  
12
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E. Retroactive Application of Miller 
The Court did not address whether the rule applies 
retroactively,82 so states have taken it upon themselves to decide.83 
In November 2012 Michigan was the first state court to address the 
retroactivity of Miller.84 This court held that it does not apply 
retroactively.85 Less than fifteen days later Illinois responded with 
its own decision holding that Miller does apply retroactively—
foreshadowing the divide between jurisdictions.86 
In 2013 the Minnesota Supreme Court in Chambers v. State also 
held that Miller does not apply retroactively.87 It decided that while 
Miller is a new rule, it is “neither substantive nor a watershed 
[procedural] rule.”88 Justice Dietzen emphasized the need for 
“finality and providing a bright-line rule,” and that “[w]ithout 
finality, the criminal law is deprived much of its deterrent effect.”89 
III. THE ROMAN NOSE DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
On June 16, 2001, Tony Allen Roman Nose was found guilty 
on two counts: (1) first-degree murder while committing or 
attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct, and (2) first-degree 
premeditated murder.90 On July 11, 2000, Jolene Stuedemann was 
found dead in her home; she was beaten, sexually assaulted, and 
 
 82.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 83.  See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114–17 (Iowa 2013) (holding 
that Miller is retroactive after using the Teague analysis). 
 84.  People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 708–09 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 496 
Mich. 440 (2014). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1021–22 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012). 
 87.  Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 330–31 (Minn. 2013). 
 88.  Id. at 331 (relying on the following facts: (1) Miller does not eliminate the 
power of the state to impose LWOR, (2) certain federal decisions held that Miller 
is procedural, and (3) Miller does not announce a new element of the offense).  
 89.  Id. at 323–24. 
 90.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Minn. 2014). 
13
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stabbed repeatedly with a screwdriver.91 She was seventeen years 
old.92 
Roman Nose was living in a group home during that time, and 
on the night of the murder he left without permission to visit his 
friend, Andy Reiman, who was dating the victim.93 The three drank 
beer and watched television at Reiman’s home.94 Although there 
was conflicting testimony about the events that took place that 
night,95 it appears that Roman Nose left Reiman’s home around 
4:00 a.m.96 The victim left Reiman’s home and returned to her own 
before Roman Nose left that evening.97 
The next morning Roman Nose returned to the group home, 
and staff contacted the police to alert them about his return.98 An 
officer questioned Roman Nose about his absence from the home 
and then subsequently responded to a call resulting in the 
discovery of the victim’s body.99 The investigators discovered a 
crumpled newspaper in the victim’s mouth, a bloodstained 
screwdriver near the victim’s body, a bathroom towel with blood on 
it, and part of a set of headphones under the victim’s body.100 
Investigators found the other half of the headphones and various 
bloodstained clothing belonging to Roman Nose concealed in a 
trash bag in a garbage can at the group home.101 The police also 
found Roman Nose’s underwear in his bedroom at the group home 
containing a mixture of semen and a bloodstain.102 
A forensic scientist performed DNA testing on the newspaper, 
screwdriver, and bathroom towel, and fingerprint analysis was 
 
 91.  State v. Roman Nose (Roman Nose I), 667 N.W.2d 386, 389–90 (Minn. 
2003).  
 92.  Id. at 389. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Roman Nose testified that he was sitting on the couch, he saw Reiman 
and Stuedemann having sex, and then he had consensual sex with Stuedemann 
while Reiman slept. Id. Reiman testified that after Reiman and Stuedemann had 
sex, he did not fall asleep right away, and Stuedemann did not have sex with 
Roman Nose while he was there. Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
14
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performed on the newspaper.103 Vaginal swabs revealed a positive 
match for Roman Nose’s DNA.104 The blood on Roman Nose’s 
jeans and jersey matched the victim’s DNA, and a fingerprint found 
on the newspaper stuffed in the victim’s mouth matched Roman 
Nose’s left middle finger.105 
Roman Nose was seventeen years and ten months old at the 
time of the murder, and he was mandatorily sentenced to LWOR.106 
On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed his conviction 
but did not address his sentence because he did not challenge it.107 
Instead, Roman Nose challenged various aspects of the DNA 
evidence used in his conviction,108 and he claimed the prosecutor 
engaged in misconduct during closing arguments.109 
Three months after the Miller decision, but prior to the 
Chambers decision, Roman Nose petitioned the district court on 
collateral review,110 arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment.111 Roman Nose sought to be resentenced to life with 
the possibility of release.112 Roman Nose sought collateral review 
almost nine years after his original sentence.113 Generally, 
postconviction petitions must be filed within two years of an 
appellate court’s disposition on direct appeal,114 but exceptions 
exist.115 Relevant to this case, a postconviction petition is not time 
 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 391. 
 105.  Id. at 390. 
 106.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 195–96 (Minn. 2014). See generally MINN. 
STAT. § 609.106, subdiv. 2(1) (2012).  
 107.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 196; accord Roman Nose I, 667 N.W.2d 386. 
 108.  Roman Nose I, 667 N.W.2d at 391–92 (objecting to the admissibility of the 
DNA because it was new type of DNA testing). 
 109.  Id. at 400–04 (claiming that the prosecutor misrepresented the DNA 
evidence, the fingerprint analysis, and the blood on the shirt, and made improper 
arguments based on character evidence). 
 110.  See generally Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1285 (2011) (defining for the 
first time collateral review of a judgment to “mean[] a judicial reexamination of a 
judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process”). 
 111.  “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 112.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 196. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  
 113.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 196. 
 114.  Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 4(a) (2012). 
 115.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 196; see MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 
15
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barred if “the petitioner asserts a new interpretation of federal . . . 
law by . . . the United States Supreme Court . . . and the petitioner 
establishes that this interpretation is retroactively applicable to the 
petitioner’s case.”116 
The district court granted Roman Nose’s petition and 
resentenced him without a Miller hearing117 to life “with the 
possibility of release after thirty years.”118 The district court first 
held that Roman Nose’s appeal was not time barred because 
Roman Nose asserted a new interpretation of federal constitutional 
law by the United States Supreme Court.119 The court then 
elaborated by adding that Miller “made a substantial change in 
federal law that does, indeed, break new ground, and was not 
dictated by precedent at the time Petitioner’s conviction 
occurred,”120 so it applied retroactively.121 
The district court struggled in deciding how to resentence 
Roman Nose, noting that he was almost thirty and it would be 
difficult “[to] envision[] Petitioner as a juvenile, and [to] apply[] 
appropriate consideration to his age, life history, home 
environment, and other circumstances.”122 The court ultimately 
concluded that it was “left with no alternative but to resentence 
Petitioner to life with the possibility of release after thirty (30) 
years.”123 
The state appealed the decision on March 18, 2013.124 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court stayed the appeal until it announced the 
Chambers decision, where it held that Miller does not apply 
 
4(b)(3). 
 116.  MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 4(b)(3).  
 117.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (allowing for courts to hold a hearing to 
make specific findings about the individual characteristics of the juveniles before 
sentencing them to LWOR).  
 118.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 197. 
 119.  Respondent’s Brief & Addendum, add. at 4, Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 
193 (No. A13-0483).  
 120.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 202. 
 121.  Respondent’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 119, add. at 9 (finding that 
Miller “made a substantial change in federal law that does, indeed, break new 
ground, and was not dictated by precedent at the time [Roman Nose’s] conviction 
occurred” and that “Miller also created a watershed rule of criminal procedure” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 122.  Id. at 12.  
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 197. 
16
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retroactively.125 On June 28, 2013, the Supreme Court lifted the stay 
in Roman Nose’s case.126 
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
Roman Nose challenged his sentence for three reasons.127 This 
case note, however, is focused on Roman Nose’s argument that the 
court wrongly decided Chambers and that Miller applies 
retroactively.128 Roman Nose also argued that the retroactivity issue 
was moot because Chambers decided the issue already, so there was 
nothing to resolve.129 He thirdly argued that the court should use its 
supervisory power130 to grant him extraordinary relief in this unique 
circumstance.131 The court held in favor of the State on all issues.132 
Ultimately, the court reversed his sentence and reinstated his 
original sentence of LWOR.133 
The majority initially noted the importance of stare decisis in 
that the court only overrules precedent for a “compelling 
reason.”134 The court then disposed of Roman Nose’s retroactivity 
argument in three ways.135 First, the court was unmoved by the fact 
that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota 
conceded that Miller applies retroactively.136 Second, the court was 
not persuaded by the fact that Miller applied retroactively to its 
companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs,137 which was pending on 
 
 125.  Id. See generally Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013). Decided 
on May 31, 2013, Chambers addressed the retroactivity of Miller for the first time in 
Minnesota. Id. 
 126.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 197. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See Respondent’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 119, at 16–23.  
 129.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 197–98. 
 130.  Id. at 201. Supervisory powers allow the court to grant relief to ensure the 
fair administration of justice. Id.  
 131.  Id. at 201–02. 
 132.  Id. at 198–201. 
 133.  Id. at 202.  
 134.  Id. at 198 (citing State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009) and 
State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005)). 
 135.  Id. at 198–200. 
 136.  Id. at 198–99 (explaining that it was aware of the U.S. attorney’s position 
prior to deciding Chambers). 
 137.  132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), rev’d, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  
17
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collateral review in state court.138 Finally, the court rejected Roman 
Nose’s argument that Chambers is flawed because Miller is both a 
substantive and a watershed procedural rule.139 Roman Nose 
contended that Miller is substantive because it “prohibit[s] the 
mandatory imposition” of LWOR, and that it is procedural because 
it requires the sentencing court to contemplate specific factors 
before sentencing a juvenile to a non-mandatory LWOR sentence.140 
The majority reiterated its holdings in Chambers, under a Teague 
analysis, and concluded that Miller is a procedural rule.141 After 
reaffirming Chambers, the court held that the district court erred 
when it concluded that Roman Nose’s petition was not time 
barred.142 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was wrong to reaffirm its 
choice to follow Teague and to determine that Miller is not 
retroactive.143 Teague is not binding on the states, and states may 
choose to abandon it.144 The United States Supreme Court created 
the Teague analysis to answer questions of retroactivity involving 
federal petitions for habeas corpus.145 Some states abandoned 
 
 138.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 199 (citing Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 
480, 494–95 (Minn. 2012) (refusing to apply a rule retroactively based solely on 
the procedural posture of a case at the Supreme Court)). See generally Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2468–69 (granting relief in both Miller and Jackson v. Hobbs).  
 139.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 199–200. 
 140.  Respondent’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 119, at 20 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
 141.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 199–200. 
 142.  Id. at 200–01. Because Miller did not apply retroactively, the time barring 
exceptions of MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subdiv. 4(a)(b)(3) (2012) also did not apply. 
Id. 
 143.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 204–05 (Page, J., dissenting) (citing 
Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 342–44 (Minn. 2013) (Page, J., dissenting)).  
 144.  Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 278–79 (2008) (“Since Teague is 
based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal 
statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts.”). 
 145.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 293, 316 (1989) (reviewing the retroactive 
application of a new criminal procedure rule on “a petition for a writ of habeas 
petition corpus” in federal court). 
18
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Teague in favor of a modified analysis146 or the Linkletter-Stovall 
approach.147 But, most states still choose to apply Teague.148 
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted various critiques about 
Teague when it originally adopted it.149 However, it overlooked these 
shortcomings in favor of the policy interest of “finality” in 
sentencing.150 That being said, this concern is basically irrelevant 
here because there are only eight juveniles sentenced to LWOR in 
Minnesota.151 Further, the Minnesota court believed that Teague 
drew a bright line and avoided the pitfall of the modified Linkletter 
approach—that it did not create uniform results.152 Similarly, 
Minnesota rejected Nevada’s modified version of Teague because it 
feared it also lacked uniform results.153 
A. Teague Produces Disparate Results 
The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to recognize that Teague 
does not create uniform results either.154 Teague works under the 
assumption that all rules fall into a dichotomy of being either 
substantive or procedural.155 When a rule is strictly substantive or 
procedural, Teague produces adequate results.156 However, the line 
 
 146.  E.g., Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002). 
 147.  See, e.g., State v. Whitefield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 266–68 (Mo. 2003); Cowell v. 
Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517–518 (S.D. 1990). 
 148.  See, e.g., State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2003); Windom v. State, 
886 So. 2d 915, 939 (Fla. 2004) (Cantero, J., concurring); Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 
613, 619 (Ga. 2003); Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 67 (Idaho 2010); Danforth v. 
State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009). 
 149.  Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 497 (acknowledging the criticism that Teague is 
“too narrow or strict, or out of place where a state court is reviewing its own 
convictions”). 
 150.  See id. (noting that states adopted Teague “on the important policy 
interest in finality”). 
 151.  Abby Simons, Eight Young Killers at Core of Life-Sentence Debate, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Mar. 28, 2014, at 1B, available at LEXIS.  
 152.  Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 499. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See id.; see also infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text (listing the cases 
finding Miller substantive and the cases finding it procedural). 
 155.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 202 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J., 
concurring) (“But Teague does not address what should be done with rules that do 
not fit neatly into either of these boxes.”). 
 156.  See, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345 (1993) (concluding that a 
new rule about jury instructions was procedural). 
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between a substantive rule and a procedural rule is not always 
clear.157 The Teague analysis does not have a solution for newly 
announced rules exhibiting both substantive and procedural 
characteristics.158 This problem exists with Miller since it exhibits 
characteristics of both a substantive rule159 and a procedural rule.160 
Minnesota definitively declared that Miller is not substantive 
and does not apply retroactively,161 but fifteen other states have had 
different interpretations of the Miller decision.162 Some held that 
Miller is substantive and applies retroactively,163 while other states 
held that it does not.164 The first courts to address Miller’s 
retroactivity, like Minnesota, failed to recognize that the rule has 
both substantive and procedural elements.165 The most recent Miller 
 
 157.  See United States v. Tayman, 885 F. Supp. 832, 841 (E.D. Va. 1995) 
(“[T]he line separating procedure and substance is not always a bright one . . . .” 
(citing Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973) (“We would not suggest that the 
distinction that we draw is an ironclad one that will invariably result in the easy 
classification of cases in one category or the other.”))).  
 158.  See generally Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (failing to address 
instances where a rule is both substantive and procedureal); Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288 (1989) (failing to address instances where a rule is both substantive and 
procedureal). 
 159.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 202–03 (explaining that Miller is substantive 
because it (1) prohibits mandatory LWOR for juveniles, which basically prohibits a 
class of punishment available to the state; and (2) potentially introduces a new 
element into sentencing structure, which modifies the elements of an offense). 
 160.  Id. at 203 (arguing that Miller is procedural because it (1) only adds one 
step to the consideration of LWOR; and (2) does not entirely prohibit LWOR for 
juveniles).  
 161.  Id. (majority opinion).  
 162.  Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral 
Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 179, 192 (2014). 
 163.  E.g., People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); State v. 
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 703 
(Miss. 2013). 
 164.  E.g., Williams v. State, No. CR-12-1862, 2014 WL 1392828, at *12 (Ala. 
Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2014); Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2013); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 844 (La. 2013); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 
685, 711 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, No. 146478, 2014 WL 3174626 (Mich. July 8, 
2014); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 327–30 (Minn. 2013); Commonwealth 
v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. 2013). 
 165.  See Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022 (“[W]e find that Miller constitutes a new 
substantive rule.”); Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711 (“It is simply the manner and factors 
to be considered in the imposition of that particular sentence that Miller dictates, 
rendering the ruling procedural and not substantive in nature.”).  
20
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retroactivity decisions, however, discern the duality of the rule.166 If 
a court chooses to paint Miller as substantive, it refers to the rule as 
“categorically bann[ing] a punishment that the law cannot impose 
upon juveniles, a mandatory life without parole sentence.”167 While 
a court interpreting Miller to be procedural concludes that Miller 
did not “eliminate the power of the State to impose” LWOR, it only 
requires the “sentencer [to] follow a certain process.”168 
Minnesota adopted Teague to draw a bright line and create 
uniform results,169 but it instead creates arbitrary results in this 
case.170 The divide in the retroactive application of Miller creates 
disparate results for juveniles sentenced to LWOR.171 A juvenile will 
be entitled to a Miller hearing based solely on where the offense was 
committed—not on the individual determination of the juvenile.172 
Further, the Minnesota branch of the Department of Justice 
conceded that Miller applies retroactively.173 Juveniles within the 
state of Minnesota will have disparate treatment depending on 
whether the state or federal government prosecutes them.174 
 
 166.  Songster v. Beard, No. 04-5916, 2014 WL 3731459, at *3 (D. Pa. July 29, 
2014).  
The Miller rule has both substantive and procedural elements. 
Substantively, it bans mandatory life without parole sentences for 
juvenile homicide defendants. Procedurally, it mandates a minimal 
process for sentencing those in that class of defendants. The former is 
a new substantive rule of criminal law. The latter is an implementation 
of the substantive rule. 
Id.  
 167.  Id. at *4.  
 168.  Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328 (Minn. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 169.  See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Minn. 2009). 
 170.  Compare Williams v. State, No. Cr-12-1862, 2014 WL 1392828, at *12 
(Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2014) (holding that Miller does not apply retroactively), 
with Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1021–22 (holding that Miller applies retroactively). 
 171.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 204 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J., 
concurring) (explaining that juveniles will receive “significant disparity in 
outcome” influenced “only by the date of the offense or by the state of 
residence”). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The 
government here has conceded that Miller is retroactive . . . .”); see also Flowers v. 
Roy, No. 13-1508, 2014 WL 1757898, at *6 (D. Minn. May 1, 2014). 
 174.  See Flowers, 2014 WL 1757898, at *9 (granting a writ of habeas corpus). 
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Uniform results are important so that similarly situated 
defendants do not receive disparate treatment. Essential to 
fundamental fairness in our judiciary is the equal treatment for 
those accused of crimes; it is why the Equal Protection Clause is 
imbedded into both the Minnesota and U.S. Constitution.175 
One of the inherent rights secured to a free people by 
[the Minnesota Constitution] is the inherent right to 
“equal and impartial laws, which govern the whole 
community and each member thereof.” Put another way, 
persons similarly situated are to be treated alike unless a 
sufficient basis exists for distinguishing among them.176 
Equal treatment of similarly situated defendants is an 
important value to the people of Minnesota.177 In fact, in the past, 
Minnesota courts chose to apply a state rule retroactively solely 
based on the equal treatment of similar defendants.178 This 
principle should carry into the decision of whether to apply Miller 
hearings retroactively to the eight Minnesotans serving life for 
childhood crimes.179 The uncertainty of the substantive/procedural 
analysis does not provide a “sufficient basis” to distinguish those 
who were previously sentenced to LWOR.180 
 
 175.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Hawes v. 1997 Jeep Wrangler, 602 N.W.2d 
874, 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (“‘Equal protection is an inherent but 
unenumerated right found and confirmed in Minnesota’s state constitution.’” 
(quoting Lundberg by Lundberg v. Jeep Corp., 582 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1998))).  
 176.  State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1991) (Simonett, J., 
concurring) (quoting Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 225, 14 
N.W.2d 400, 405 (1944)). 
 177.  See id. 
 178.  State v. Baird, 654 N.W.2d 105, 112 (Minn. 2002) (rejecting the 
application of a civil retroactivity rule and basing retroactivity solely on the 
reasoning that “hold[ing] otherwise would be to treat similarly situated criminal 
defendants differently”). Minnesota never addressed this case and its weight on 
the Chambers or Roman Nose decisions. Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193 (Minn. 
2014); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013); Roman Nose I, 667 N.W. 
2d 386 (Minn. 2003).  
 179.  Simons, supra note 151.  
 180.  See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 893 (citing Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 
N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1985)).  
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B. Narrowing the Retroactivity Doctrine 
Minnesota’s application of Teague also has a limiting effect on 
the future of the retroactivity doctrine.181 The majority labeled the 
Miller rule as procedural without discussing Teague’s inadequate 
application to rules exhibiting both substantive and procedural 
characteristics.182 It is unclear where the line between substantive 
and procedural rules now lies.183 Nevertheless, Chambers and Roman 
Nose create precedent allowing rules exhibiting both substantive 
and procedural characteristics to be defaulted as procedural.184 
Once a rule is labeled procedural, it only applies retroactively 
if it is considered a watershed procedural rule.185 A watershed 
procedural rule “alters our understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding.”186 
Since the inception of Teague, a rule has yet to be considered a 
watershed rule.187 This suggests that even fewer rules will be applied 
retroactively in Minnesota.188 
It is not the intention of this note to argue for the broadest 
application of retroactivity; there must be limits. However, the 
doctrine should not be so limited to exclude the benefit of a Miller 
hearing to all juveniles currently serving LWOR. In the case of 
sentencing, particularly as applied to juveniles, a narrowed 
retroactivity doctrine has a negative effect.189 Even commenters in 
 
 181.  Compare Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 203 (Anderson, J., concurring), 
with Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting). 
 182.  See Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 202–03; Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 327. 
 183.  See Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 203. 
 184.  See id. (agreeing that “[b]ased on the current state of the law . . . the 
Miller rule is procedural” after explaining how Miller has both substantive and 
procedural characteristics); Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 328.  
 185.  See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311–12 (1989) (explaining how 
retroactivity is reserved only for watershed rules of criminal procedure). 
 186.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 200 (citing Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 331). 
 187.  7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6(e) (3d ed. 2013) 
(citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004)).  
 188.  See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 502 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (foreseeing the narrowing scope of Teague). 
 189.  See Douglas A. Berman, Re-balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for 
Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 153 (2014); Sarah French Russell, 
Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 
126–27 (2012) (“Retroactivity doctrines should not be a bar to relief when a 
prisoner seeks to rely on a case . . . that has narrowed the scope of a sentencing 
23
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favor of a narrow retroactivity doctrine recognize that relief should 
be given to juveniles in some cases.190 Miller is a special 
circumstance in which the traditional Teague retroactivity doctrine 
produces the wrong result.191 
C. Dollars and Cents 
Another critique of Miller hearings is that they are too costly192 
and inaccurate,193 but this view is shortsighted. First, resentencing 
hearings will save money systemically by reducing the cost of 
imprisoning juveniles given reduced sentences.194 Juveniles 
sentenced to LWOR are likely serving the longest prison sentences 
because they enter prison at an earlier age than any other 
defendant, and they do not have the opportunity for release.195 
Juveniles sentenced to LWOR will grow old and die in prison.196 
They “add to the rising geriatric prison population and place heavy 
financial burdens on states.”197 In the United States the average cost 
of incarceration is $22,000 annually—$36,836 in Minnesota198—and 
the sentence can be expected to last at least fifty-five years if the 
 
enhancement provision.”). 
 190.  E.g., Scott, supra note 162, at 226–27.  
I earnestly hope that Miller . . . affects all of the more than two 
thousand sentences imposed in violation of the rule but which became 
final before the decision. As a matter of justice, every juvenile offender 
serving a mandatory sentence of life without parole deserves an 
opportunity to request resentencing or parole. 
Id.  
 191.  See generally Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 200 (refusing to apply Miller 
retroactively). 
 192.  E.g., Scott, supra note 162, at 197–202 (arguing that resentencing 
hearings are costly “both in time and resources”).  
 193.  E.g., id. at 203–08 (arguing that the rules of evidence do not apply in 
resentencing hearings and that too much time has passed since the original 
sentencing hearing). 
 194.  Russell, supra note 189, at 150. 
 195.  See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A 
NATIONAL SURVEY 33 (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc 
/publications/jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf. 
 196.  Id. at 1. 
 197.  Id. at 33. 
 198.  JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: STATE 
PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, 3 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content 
/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf. 
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juvenile is sentenced in his or her late teens.199 However, the cost of 
care for inmates rises with age, and at age fifty-five the annual 
average cost of incarceration is closer to $65,000.200 This yields a 
lifetime average cost of $2 million per prisoner.201 Adding the 
possibility of parole could substantially reduce the lifetime 
incarceration cost of a juvenile inmate.202 
Second, resentencing hearings on direct appeal often take 
place years after the original sentence,203 and courts are allowed to 
consider additional information at resentencing.204 So, the simple 
fact that a juvenile receives a Miller hearing years later does not 
necessarily mean the hearing is more expensive or difficult than a 
direct appeal hearing.205 Further, resentencing juveniles will not 
represent “sunk costs”206 by the court since the juveniles received 
mandatory sentences.207 Necessarily, they could not have cost the 
court because the court was restricted from making any 
considerations.208 
Third, juveniles allowed a Miller hearing are not entitled to a 
new trial.209 Courts have noted that resentencing hearings are much 
less burdensome than new trials.210 Juveniles sentenced to life are 
 
 199.  NELLIS, supra note 195, at 33. 
 200.  Id. (citing B. JAYE ANNO ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., CORRECTIONAL 
HEALTH CARE: ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF ELDERLY, CHRONICALLY ILL, AND 
TERMINALLY ILL INMATES 9 (2004)). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Russell, supra note 189, at 150. 
 203.  See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1236 (2011) 
(resentencing taking place five years after direct appeal).  
 204.  Id. at 1236 (holding that district courts may consider post-sentencing 
rehabilitation when resentencing defendants). 
 205.  See Russell, supra note 189, at 146–52. 
 206.  A “sunk cost” is “[a] cost that has already been incurred and cannot be 
recovered.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 423 (10th ed. 2014). In this context, a “sunk 
cost” refers to the cost a court spends on making specific findings before 
sentencing a juvenile to LWOR.  
 207.  Scott, supra note 162, at 213 (“Those cases also involve few ‘sunk costs’ 
because by definition the life without parole sentence was mandatory.”). 
 208.  See id. 
 209.  See generally Scott, supra note 162, at 181 (discussing factors that favor 
resentencing over retrial). 
 210.  See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (reasoning 
that sentencing hearings take much less time and are much less costly than new 
trials). But see Scott, supra note 162, at 181 (“[R]oughly ninety-five percent of 
criminal convictions result from guilty pleas rather than trials.”). 
25
Mazurek: Criminal Law: No Looking Back: Narrowing the Scope of the Retroac
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
2015] ROMAN NOSE V. STATE 355 
 
only entitled to a hearing that takes individualized characteristics 
into consideration.211 Retroactive Miller hearings will only need to 
be conducted for a finite number of juveniles and will not allow 
every sentenced juvenile to receive a reduced sentence.212 
D. Juveniles Sentenced to LWOR: Deterrence v. Rehabilitation 
This abstract discussion of retroactivity affects juveniles 
spending the rest of their lives in prison.213 An estimated 2574 
juveniles are currently sentenced to LWOR throughout the 
country.214 When the district court resentenced Roman Nose to life 
with the possibility of parole after thirty years, it did not consider 
his individual characteristics.215 The court should have granted him 
a Miller hearing in order to adhere to the United States Supreme 
Court’s goal of rehabilitation in connection with juvenile 
offenders.216 
Rehabilitation is a closely linked goal to the juvenile system 
since children are categorically different from adults.217 The Court 
in Roper, which prohibited the death penalty, relied on the fact that 
“any parent” or expert would confirm that juveniles are different 
from adults in three ways.218 First, they lack maturity, which lends 
itself readily to making poor decisions.219 Second, children are 
“more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
 
 211.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468–69 (2012).  
 212.  See generally State-by-State Map, Graphic on Juveniles Serving Life Sentences 
Without Parole in the U.S., PBS FRONTLINE (May 8, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh 
/pages/frontline/whenkidsgetlife/etc/map.html#more [hereinafter State-by-State 
Map] (estimating that 2574 juveniles are sentenced to LWOR based on data from 
Human Rights Watch as of 2009).  
 213.  See Scott, supra note 162, at 179. See generally Beth Schwartzapfel, Sentenced 
Young: The Story of Life Without Parole for Juveniles Offenders, AL JEZEERA AM. 
(Feb.  1,  2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/features/2014/1/sentenced-young                
-thestoryoflifewithoutparoleforjuvenileoffenders.html (profiling stories of juveniles 
serving LWOR). 
 214.  State-by-State Map, supra note 212.  
 215.  Brief & Appendix of Appellant at 9, Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193 
(Minn. 2014) (No. A13-0483) (stating that Roman Nose was resentenced without 
holding a sentencing hearing). 
 216.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (remanding for a resentencing hearing).  
 217.  See Walling & Driver, supra note 43, at 889–93. 
 218.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 219.  Id.  
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pressures.”220 Third, and most important to the discussion of 
rehabilitation, a juvenile’s character is not as well formed as an 
adult’s.221 The Court also stressed rehabilitation when banning 
juvenile LWOR for non-homicide crimes: 
Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no 
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for 
reconciliation with society, no hope. Maturity can lead to 
that considered reflection which is the foundation for 
remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. A young person who 
knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before 
life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible 
individual.222 
On the other hand, Justice Dietzen in Chambers emphasized 
deterrence as a primary reason not to apply Miller retroactively,223 
despite the United States Supreme Court admitting that deterrence 
does not justify an imposition of LWOR in non-homicide cases.224 
Juveniles lack the maturity and have an undeveloped sense of 
responsibility, often resulting in “‘impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions.’”225 “The same characteristics that render 
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be 
less susceptible to deterrence.”226 In fact, “swiftness and certainty of 
conviction, rather than sentence severity, is most relevant to 
effective deterrence.”227 It is even suggested that people are more 
 
 220.  Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1984) (“[Y]outh is more 
than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be 
most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”)).  
 221.  Id. at 570 (“The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less 
fixed.”).  
 222.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).  
 223.  Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 320, 323 (Minn. 2013) (“Application 
of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final 
seriously undermines the principle of finality . . . . Without finality, the criminal 
law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 309 (1989))). 
 224.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (“Deterrence does not suffice to justify the 
sentence either.”). 
 225.  Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).  
 226.  Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (2005)). 
 227.  Russell, supra note 189, at 154 (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal 
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 n.21 
(1963)). 
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deterred by a system that is viewed as just and legitimate than one 
with harsher penalties.228 
Beyond the debate of whether the goal in sentencing juveniles 
should be rehabilitation or deterrence, it is interesting to note that 
state statutes have never explicitly endorsed the policy of 
sentencing juveniles to LWOR.229 Rather, it came about as a 
“statutory accident.”230 In Graham, Justice Kennedy noted, “the 
statutory eligibility of a juvenile offender for life without parole 
does not indicate that the penalty has been endorsed through 
deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration.”231 Since 
LWOR for juveniles was imposed without any express 
consideration, courts should take the time to reflect and come to 
the conclusion that rehabilitation outweighs deterrence as a policy 
goal for juveniles sentenced to LWOR. The Roman Nose and 
Chambers decisions are contrary to that policy, and for the eight that 
serve life for crimes committed as juveniles in Minnesota, the 
retroactivity analysis should have allowed them the opportunity to 
receive a Miller hearing.232 
E. Forging a New Retroactivity Doctrine in Minnesota 
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have applied a 
modified Teague analysis to determine that Miller applies 
retroactively.233 The court should follow Nevada’s lead in adopting 
a broader retroactivity doctrine, which accounts for new rules that 
do not fit into the substantive/procedural dichotomy.234 This 
flexibility would not force the court to make such rigid 
 
 228.  Id. (citing Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and 
Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 173, 176–77 (2008)) (suggesting that a high incarceration rate can undermine 
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system).  
 229.  NELLIS, supra note 195, at 28 (citing Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 
749, 766 (2012)). 
 230.  Id.  
 231.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 67. 
 232.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 233.  See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 500 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (“I would not adopt Teague in total, rather I would, as the Nevada 
Supreme Court has done, adopt the basic approach set forth in Teague but with 
some significant qualifications.”). 
 234.  See id.; Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002). 
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determinations in ambiguous circumstances, like in this case.235 
Nevada allowed itself the flexibility to retain the basic outline of the 
Teague rule, while being able to make exceptions when it felt 
necessary.236 Although this case note does not advocate adopting 
the same rule, it is prudent to use the same principle in crafting a 
retroactivity rule that works for Minnesota.237 The analysis the court 
should use must take into account the purpose and effect of the 
rule that is being addressed.238 
1. The Guiding Principle of the Retroactivity Doctrine and Miller 
Hearings 
The United States Supreme Court limited retroactivity as an 
administrative need because it is not possible to apply every new 
decision retroactively to cases already finished.239 It needed to find a 
cutoff line to determine which cases are worthy of receiving the 
 
 235.  Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 500 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The policy 
interests of finality and uniformity addressed by Teague are important, but I 
conclude that the Supreme Court has applied the Teague rule so narrowly and 
strictly that many cases involving constitutional safeguards that warrant collateral 
review have not or will not receive such review.”); see also Chambers v. State, 831 
N.W.2d 311, 341 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 236.  Colwell, 59 P.3d 463 at 471 (“[W]e are free to choose the degree of 
retroactivity or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule 
under consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional rights at least as 
broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court requires.” (quoting State v. 
Fair, 502 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Or. 1972))).  
 237.  Other jurisdictions have considered the defendant’s equal treatment as 
an additional factor in the retroactivity analysis. See, e.g., Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y 
for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 282 (Mass. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 
716, 728–29 (Neb. 2014) (citing State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 
2013)). A prior William Mitchell Law Review case note argued for the adoption of 
the modified Nevada approach when the Supreme Court held that Teague is not 
binding on the states. Zorislav R. Leyderman, Note, Criminal Law: Minnesota 
Formally Adopts the Teague Retroactivity Standard for State Post-Conviction Proceedings—
Danforth v. State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297, 321 (2009). Although this is a 
well-reasoned alternative, it did not contemplate cases where a new rule of 
criminal procedure is not clearly substantive or procedural. See id. The analysis 
suggested in this case note addresses this issue. See supra Part IV.A. 
 238.  South Dakota’s rule also takes into account the purpose of the rule in 
adopting a modified Linkletter approach. Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517 
(S.D. 1990).  
 239.  Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 273 (2008) (citing Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)). 
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benefit of a retroactive rule.240 The guiding principle that the Court 
used in Teague is to determine if a new rule of criminal procedure 
changes our view on whether a person is considered guilty.241 
If a new rule is substantive, it typically does one of three things. 
First, a substantive rule “prohibit[s] a certain category of 
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or 
offense.”242 Second, a substantive rule “alters the range of conduct 
or the class of persons that the law punishes.”243 Third, a substantive 
rule “narrow[s] the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its 
terms.”244 Each of these changes the view of whether a convicted 
person is still considered guilty.245 A substantive rule “necessarily 
carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an 
act that the law does not make criminal.”246 Alternatively, a 
procedural criminal rule only addresses the process of how 
someone’s guilt is determined, not whether the person in question 
is still considered culpable.247 As Justice Scalia pointed out, it is 
more speculative whether a person is still considered culpable 
when the new rule is procedural.248 
The purpose of the retroactivity doctrine turns on whether a 
rule will continue to define someone as criminally culpable.249 In 
the administration of the court, a rule should apply to defendants 
whose cases are long since closed only when it changes whether 
they are considered criminally culpable.250 However, when the 
 
 240.  See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627–30. 
 241.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004).  
 242.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated by Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989).  
 243.  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353.  
 244.  Id. at 351. 
 245.  Id. at 352. 
 246.  Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 247.  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. at 352. This is a slight oversimplification of the rule, ignoring the 
bedrock procedural rule exception. Id. (giving retroactive effect in “only a small 
set of ‘watershed rules . . .’” (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990))). 
The underlying principle in the second exception is the implication of 
“‘fundamental fairness and accuracy,’” which is tangential to this discussion. Id. 
(quoting Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495). 
 250.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–10 (1989) (agreeing with Justice 
Harlan’s previous concurrences and dissents that retroactivity should be reserved 
30
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United States Supreme Court devised the substantive/procedural 
analysis to accomplish this goal, it divorced itself from the 
underlying principle guiding the distinction created in the 
retroactivity rule.251 Instead, courts focus on this extremely abstract, 
often arbitrary, analysis contemplating if a rule is substantive or 
procedural.252 
Miller is guided by the same basic principle—to protect a 
group of people categorically distinguished as less criminally 
culpable.253 In the very special circumstance of sentencing juveniles 
to our nation’s second, and Minnesota’s first, harshest punishment, 
Miller commands a sentencing court to determine culpability.254 It 
guides the determination of whether a juvenile is in fact culpable 
for the crime that they committed, or whether they lack the 
maturity, understanding, and foresight to be criminally liable.255 If 
they are not as criminally liable for their actions, Miller implies they 
should not be sentenced to LWOR.256 
2. Minnesota Fails to Recognize the Underlying Principle of 
Specialized Considerations for the Less Culpable in Not Applying 
Miller Retroactively 
The guiding principle of both prohibiting mandatory LWOR 
and determining retroactivity is actually the same: people deemed 
 
for limited, worthy cases).  
 251.  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52 (defining the distinction the Court uses in its 
retroactivity analysis in terms of substance versus procedure and shifting the 
analysis away from the language in Teague). 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457, 2464 (2012) (citing Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 571 (2005)) (recognizing that juveniles have diminished 
culpability).  
 254.  Id. at 2469; see also MINN. STAT. § 609.106, subdiv. 2 (2012) (LWOR is 
Minnesota’s harshest penalty); John D. Bessler, The “Midnight Assassination Law” 
and Minnesota’s Anti-Death Penalty Movement, 1849–1911, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
577, 690 (1996) (reviewing the history of Minnesota’s 1911 abolition of the death 
penalty).  
 255.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 256.  Id. (“‘A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom,’ but must 
provide ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.’” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 
(2010))).  
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less criminally culpable should receive extra consideration.257 In the 
case of retroactivity, the court applies a rule retroactively if the 
convicted is no longer considered as criminally liable, despite the 
case being concluded.258 In the case of juveniles sentenced to 
LWOR, the court must decide whether they are too immature to be 
criminally liable.259 But, Minnesota’s driving goal in adopting 
Teague was finality and evenhandedness.260 
The United States Supreme Court abandoned Linkletter and 
devised a new rule so that retroactivity is uniformly applied.261 But, 
uniformity was not the reason why the Court chose to create the 
substantive/procedural dichotomy specifically for rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure.262 As stated above, the 
substantive/procedural analysis is used to determine whether the 
change in the rule negates the culpability of the convicted.263 In 
adopting Teague and ignoring the underlying goal of determining 
retroactivity, the Minnesota Supreme Court and other courts are 
blinded by the strict application of the retroactivity rule.264 Courts 
get bogged down in the abstract idea of substance versus 
procedure.265 The guiding principle is lost in its application.266 
 
 257.  Compare Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) (providing an additional 
hearing at sentencing to determine a juvenile’s culpability before handing down a 
LWOR sentence), with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (providing 
retroactivity to defendants when federal law substantively changes).  
 258.  See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004). 
 259.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  
 260.  Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 497–99 (Minn. 2009).  
 261.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 302. 
 262.  The court adopted the new dividing line based on the concurrences and 
dissents of Justice Harlan. See id. (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256–
57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 263.  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352. 
 264.  See Berman, supra note 189, at 166 (“Consequently, it is now critically 
important for policy-makers, courts, and scholars to consider more thoughtfully 
and thoroughly the values and interests served—and not served—by doctrines, 
policies, and practices that may allow or preclude the review of sentences after 
they have been deemed final.”). 
 265.  See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 326–30 (Minn. 2013). But see 
Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 203 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging both the substantive and procedural characteristics of Miller).  
 266.  See Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002) (“Though we consider 
the approach to retroactivity set forth in Teague to be sound principle, the 
Supreme Court has applied it so strictly in practice that decisions defining a 
constitutional safeguard rarely merit application on collateral review.”); Cowell v. 
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Minnesota fails to recognize that the retroactivity doctrine is used 
to determine whether a rule has the power to change someone’s 
culpability.267 Similarly, Minnesota’s analysis fails to recognize that 
the rule announced in Miller is used to determine whether a 
juvenile is considered sufficiently criminally liable to impose 
LWOR.268 Minnesota should employ a retroactivity rule that allows 
it to recognize both of these underlying considerations without 
getting stuck in the strict substantive/procedural dichotomy.269 
3. New Rule: Consider the Underlying Principle in Ambiguous Cases 
This case note is not advocating for a rule that markedly 
broadens the retroactivity doctrine, but for one that clarifies the 
analysis. In order to accomplish this, the court should adopt a 
modified Teague analysis, like Nevada did, which takes into account 
an additional consideration when a new rule is not clearly 
substantive or procedural.270 Minnesota should explicitly consider 
whether the rule, as applied, would change the culpability of those 
seeking retroactive application.271 
The proposed rule is administrable, encourages uniform 
results, and provides meaningful relief for those who deserve it.272 
The traditional Teague analysis should still apply in cases when the 
rule being reviewed is clearly substantive or procedural. It is not 
necessary to delve into a second layer of analysis if a new rule is 
clearly substantive or procedural. But, in ambiguous cases, a second 
analysis should be triggered. A simple question can be employed: 
would applying this rule to the defendant have the likelihood to 
 
Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 518 (S.D. 1990) (“We find the Teague rule to be unduly 
narrow as to what issues it will consider on collateral review.”). 
 267.  See Schriro, 542 U.S at 352. 
 268.  See Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d at 201; Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 325–27.  
 269.  See Berman, supra note 189, at 151. 
 270.  See Colwell, 59 P.3d at 471. 
 271.  See id. Nevada’s modified Teague analysis is not described in these exact 
terms, but it is based in the principle that it may give broader relief when it sees fit. 
Id.  
 272.  Since Miller does not fit into the substantive/procedural dichotomy, 
courts decide whether to deem it substantive or procedural. See Songster v. Beard, 
No. 04-5916, 2014 WL 3731459, at *3 (D. Pa., July 29, 2014). The extra 
consideration creates a marker for courts to use to disentangle the ambiguity of 
the rule while making a fair determination on the individual case. Id. 
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reasonably negate whether the defendant is considered guilty?273 If 
the answer is yes, the rule should apply retroactively; if the answer is 
no, the rule is not worth applying retroactively. In the case of Miller, 
the answer is yes.274 If a juvenile is found to lack the maturity, 
forethought, and ability to understand the gravity of a decision 
after a Miller hearing, he or she will not be considered criminally 
culpable enough to be sentenced to LWOR.275 
4. Roman Nose 
In this case, Roman Nose committed a horrendous crime, and 
nothing can make up for that fact.276 This case note does not 
advocate for Roman Nose’s release from prison, or even that he 
should receive a reduced sentence. As a juvenile sentenced to 
LWOR, however, the Eighth Amendment entitles him to one 
hearing to consider his culpability as a juvenile convicted of 
murder.277 Constitutional rights should not be withheld arbitrarily 
because the analysis is ambiguous. 
It is likely that the day may never come when Roman Nose 
receives a reduced sentence, but the guiding principle of the 
retroactivity doctrine dictates that he at least be given the 
 
 273.  It is not the same determination as to whether the process used to find 
guilt was accurate. It is not an evidentiary determination, but a determination of 
what is understood as guilt. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) 
(explaining that procedural rules “merely raise the possibility that someone 
convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted 
otherwise”). See generally Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 168 (1996) (holding 
that a new rule requiring adequate notice of evidence to be used at the penalty 
hearing of a capital murder trial was procedural).  
 274.  See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013). 
There is a strong argument that Miller should apply retroactively: It 
says that it is beyond the authority of the criminal law to impose a 
mandatory sentence of life without parole. It would be terribly unfair 
to have individuals imprisoned for life without any chance of parole 
based on the accident of the timing of the trial. 
Id. (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means 
Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 
8:30  AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/Chemerinsky_juvenile_life             
-without-parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/). 
 275.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 276.  See Roman Nose I, 667 N.W.2d 386, 389–90 (Minn. 2003).  
 277.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.  
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opportunity. Again, this would not allow every child sentenced to 
LWOR to receive a reduced sentence.278 For some children—as sad 
as it is to admit—there is no saving, and there is nowhere else to 
place them. They will need to live and die behind bars because of 
the threat they pose to society. The Supreme Court has likened 
LWOR to a death sentence for juveniles.279 Applying Miller 
retroactively would not create black letter law mandating all 
juveniles sentenced to LWOR receive new sentences.280 It would 
only give relief to those who deserve it.281 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s second application of Miller 
in Roman Nose gave the court the opportunity to reflect on its 
Chambers decision. The court again affirmed a rule meant to create 
a bright line on retroactivity, but—as shown all around the 
country—it has created disparate results for juveniles sentenced to 
LWOR.282 The underlying goals of both the retroactivity doctrine 
and the rule pronounced in Miller are similar, and Minnesota’s 
retroactivity doctrine should be flexible enough to take this into 
consideration. However, the differing interpretations among the 
states and the way they have addressed the issue283 suggest that the 
 
 278.  Id. at 2474–75. 
 279.  Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 332 (Minn. 2013) (citing Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466–67 (2012)) (“The Supreme Court has held that 
[LWOR] is tantamount to a death sentence for an offender who . . . is sentenced 
for a crime committed when he was a juvenile.”). 
 280.  Id. at 333 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (explaining that a remand for a 
Miller sentencing hearing “does not in and of itself change the life-in-prison-
without-release aspect of [a petitioner’s] sentence,” but allows him or her the 
opportunity to have a hearing). 
 281.  See id.  
 282.  For further discussion of the cultural aspects of juveniles sentenced to 
LWOR, see NELLIS supra note 195. 
 283.  Some states have chosen to address the issue legislatively. Compare CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West, Westlaw through ch. 931 of 2014 Leg. 
Sess.) (allowing petition after fifteen years), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 4204A(d)(1)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Leg. Sess.) (allowing petition after 
thirty years), and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(E)(1) (West, Westlaw through 
2014 Leg. Sess.) (allowing petition after thirty-five years), and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
10-301(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Leg. Sess.) (allowing petition after twenty-
five years), with H.F. 3358, 88th Leg. Sess. (Minn.) (as introduced to House on 
Apr. 28, 2014) (prohibiting LWOR petitions). 
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United States Supreme Court should ultimately decide whether 
Miller applies retroactively.284 Until that happens, Minnesota should 
adopt a modified Teague analysis, allowing it to take into 
consideration the underlying principle of the newly announced 
rule in ambiguous cases. 
 
 
 
 284.  Roman Nose II, 845 N.W.2d 193, 204 (Minn. 2014) (Lillehaug, J., 
concurring) (“One can only hope that the United States Supreme Court will take 
its earliest opportunity to clarify whether [Miller] applies retroactively.”). 
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